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Suppose that Alice and Bob define their coordinate axes differently, and the change of reference
frame between them is given by a probability distribution µ over SO(3). We show that this uncer-
tainty of reference frame is of no use for bit commitment when µ is uniformly distributed over a
(sub)group of SO(3), but other choices of µ can give rise to a partially or even asymptotically secure
bit commitment.
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It has been one of the goals of quantum information
theory to find new cryptographic applications of quan-
tum physics. The prime and most successful example
of such an application is the protocol of quantum key
distribution developed by Bennett & Brassard in 1984
[1], which implements a cryptographic primitive that is
impossible to obtain via classical means.
Another cryptographic primitive of great interest is se-
cure bit commitment. Bit commitment protocols typi-
cally involve two phases: a commit phase, in which Alice
commits to a bit b (called the message), and the reveal
phase, when Bob learns b. The requirements for secure
bit commitment are that the protocol is (at least approx-
imately) sound, meaning that when both parties are hon-
est Bob accepts the message b; binding, meaning that af-
ter the commit phase, a cheating Alice will never be able
to reliably convince Bob of more than a single value of b
(although she may force Bob to abort the protocol); and
concealing, meaning that a cheating Bob cannot learn
the value of b before the reveal stage, irrespective of his
cheating strategy (of course, no guarantees are possible
if both parties cheat).
Unlike the case of key distribution, neither classical
nor quantum resources suffice for secure bit commitment
under general circumstances [2, 3, 4], not even when
both parties participating in the protocol are restricted
by local superselection rules [5]. However, it is pos-
sible to build secure bit commitment using additional
assumptions, such as the hardness of performing certain
calculations in polynomial-time [6, 7] or, in the classical
case, the availability of a known, noisy (i.i.d.) channel
between the parties (see Ref. [8] and references therein).
This Letter is concerned with the possibility of secure
quantum bit commitment when the spatial frames of ref-
erence between the parties are misaligned. Depending on
a single qubit’s physical implementation, its definitions
∗Electronic address: aram@mit.edu
†Electronic address: rob.oliv@gmail.com
‡Electronic address: terhal@watson.ibm.com
of |0〉 and |1〉 are given by a local measurement setting
which may be directionally dependent. For example, a
spin qubit realization will depend on the orientation of
locally applied magnetic fields and qubits based on po-
larization degrees of freedom will depend on the local
settings of polarization filters. This means that between
different locations there may be a misalignment of such
spatial frames. Misaligned reference frames could also
arise in a (special) relativistic setting [9]. Assume that
Alice’s inertial frame moves at relative velocity ~v with
respect to Bob and Alice and Bob have partial infor-
mation about this velocity. This implies that quantum
information sent between the parties is subject to uni-
tary transformations representing boosts in the Lorentz
group.
Several recent papers have studied the problem of mis-
aligned reference frames. Researchers have considered
the task of communicating a reference frame or direction
[10, 11, 12, 13], communication in the presence of mis-
aligned reference frames [14], or the cryptographic use of
a private shared reference frame [15].
In our set-up we assume that Alice and Bob de-
fine their computational bases {|0〉, |1〉} differently.
That is, suppose Alice uses {|0A〉, |1A〉} and Bob uses
{|0B〉, |1B〉}. Let U = |0B〉〈0A| + |1B〉〈1A| be the 2 × 2
unitary matrix relating these bases. If the reference
frames are related by a 3-dimensional rotation R taken
from probability measure µ, then via the homomorphism
between SU(2) and SO(3), U ∈ SU(2) represents a
sample from µ. The distribution µ captures Alice’s and
Bob’s information, which we assume to be the same,
about the misalignment between their reference frames.
For example, if Alice and Bob have no knowledge about
their misalignment, they assume that U is uniformly at
random from SU(2). Partial but identical knowledge
by both parties can be represented by a more involved
distribution µ. The effect of the misalignment is that
everything Alice sends to Bob is multiplied by U (in
his frame of reference) and everything Bob sends to
Alice will be multiplied by U †. This is not unlike a
noisy quantum channel. Notice, however, that unlike an
ordinary quantum channel, no quantum information is
destroyed by channel uses. For example, if Bob sends the
2state back to Alice, she will recover her original message;
or if Bob later learns an approximate description of U ,
then he can apply a unitary close to U † and obtain a
state close to what Alice sent. Moreover, if Alice sends
k qubits, the ‘channel’ applies a random U⊗k to the
k qubits, unlike k independent copies of a standard
channel.
Our main goal in this Letter is to determine whether
the no-go results for bit commitment still hold under the
assumption of misaligned reference frames. Our results
are two-fold. On the one hand, we prove that if µ is
uniform over SU(2) or a subgroup of SU(2), then the
standard security results of bit commitment still hold.
On the other hand, we also show that there exists dis-
tributions µ, albeit somewhat artificial, that give rise to
asymptotically secure bit commitment.
Let us now prove our first result, namely if the rotation
relating Alice to Bob’s reference frame is completely un-
known, i.e. µ is a uniform distribution over (a subgroup
of) SU(2), then bit commitment is impossible.
Theorem 1 Let G be a subgroup of SU(2), and µ the
uniform distribution over G. If there exists a bit com-
mitment protocol P using misalignment characterized by
µ, then there exists a protocol P ′ using a standard noise-
less quantum channel and locally aligned reference frames
with identical security parameters.
The theorem shows that there is no gain in bit com-
mitment security over what is possible in the standard
scenario when the misalignment is taken uniformly at
random in some group, for example rotations around
some fixed axis in the Bloch sphere. Thus, as in the
standard case, perfectly secure bit commitment is
impossible for such misalignments Here is the proof of
the theorem:
Proof Given P , we construct P ′ as follows. Alice and
Bob choose random rotations UA and UB uniformly at
random from G. The protocol P ′ follows P , but with the
following changes:
• Before sending any qubit, Alice applies UA.
• After receiving any qubit, Alice applies U †A.
• Before sending any qubit, Bob applies UB.
• After receiving any qubit, Bob applies U †B.
If both parties are honest, then P ′ functions the same
way as P , except with the reference frames of the two
parties related by U †BUA. Since UA and UB are chosen
uniformly at random, U †BUA is as well, and the protocol
simulates P exactly. Therefore P ′ is just as sound as P .
Now suppose one party, say Bob, cheats. We can make
no assumptions about Bob’s actions, but since Alice is
still honest, her random selection of UA is enough to
randomize her reference frame from Bob’s point of view.
Furthermore, she otherwise follows P , so Bob cannot dis-
tinguish Alice’s half of P ′ from P being executed over a
channel with a genuinely random rotation. Therefore P ′
is just as concealing as P .
If instead Alice cheats, the same argument shows that
P ′ is just as binding as P .
We will now show that the conclusion of Theorem 1
does not hold for general distributions µ. Since noisy
classical channels can have a bit commitment capacity
[8] (which is achieved by coding), we may expect that
a single use of such a channel could lead to a bit com-
mitment that goes beyond what is possible without the
noisy channel. In fact we will prove a stronger result,
namely that there exists a distribution that allows for an
asymptotically secure bit commitment.
The classical protocols developed in [8] are of the fol-
lowing form, which we shall also employ: Alice chooses
a set of codewords Ca,b, where b is the message (usually
a single bit) to be committed and a is another index of
arbitrary size that is picked randomly. She sends Ca,b
through the channel to commit to b, and reveals b by
sending (a, b). Bob will typically accept if there is a high
likelihood that the noisy message that he received in the
commit phase originated from the codeword Ca,b for the
values of a, b that Alice gives him in the reveal phase. We
cannot apply such a protocol directly since our ‘misalign-
ment channel’ is not i.i.d. (independent and identically
distributed) which rules out asymptotic coding results.
Furthermore, we are considering quantum instead of clas-
sical information.
The latter issue is easily fixed. We will consider the
limit in which the quantum information that Alice sends
behaves classically, that is, Bob can perfectly (in the
classical limit) distinguish the states |Ca,b〉. In case we
deal with ‘misalignment channels’ for photon polariza-
tion, this means that Alice will send Bob a very bright
beam of identically polarized photons, so that Bob can
determine this polarization vector with high accuracy. If
we are working with spins, the codewords that we will
use will be spin J particles for J →∞.
Since any classical protocol has an underlying quan-
tum mechanical implementation, one cannot exclude a
priori the possibility for a coherent quantum attack, even
though this kind of attack may be technically hard to
implement in the classical limit. This kind of attack has
been the main limitation to the security of quantum bit
commitment [2, 3, 4]. In the coherent quantum attack Al-
ice has an additional ancilla entangled with the codeword
that she will send to Bob, i.e. she holds a purification of
the state she sends to Bob. This may enable her to cheat
at the revealing stage. However, for the schemes that we
will consider, we can easily argue that such a cheating
strategy will not give Alice extra power. We do this by
demanding that an honest Bob always first measures the
quantum state he obtains from Alice. Since we are in
the classical limit, his measurement (of polarization or
spin-direction) will hardly disturb the state, but it will
3remove all entanglement between Alice’s ancilla and the
state that she sends. This means that, upon Bob’s mea-
surement (he acts like a decohering environment) we are
now back in the situation where Alice sends the state
|Ca,b〉 with some probability.
Thus we now show that for a certain distribution µ
over SO(3) there exists a classical scheme using three-
dimensional vectors that gives rise to an asymptotically
secure bit commitment.
We start with an example inspired by [8] that demon-
strates that some security gain is easily constructed.
Ref. [8] introduces a classical channel that inputs i ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3} and outputs i with probability 1/2 and i + 1
(mod 4) with probability 1/2. Define codewords Ca,b =
2a + b for a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Bob accepts if Alice reveals
a codeword that has nonzero (i.e. 1/2) probability of
giving rise to what he received from the channel. The
protocol is perfectly sound and concealing, but not bind-
ing; Alice can cheat with probability 1/2. This security
should be compared to the standard quantum or classical
case where being perfectly sound and perfect concealing
implies that Alice can cheat with probability 1.
One use of this channel can be simulated by a frame
shift that has probability 1/2 of being the identity and
probability 1/2 of being a rotation about the z-axis by
π/2. The codewords are {xˆ, yˆ,−xˆ,−yˆ}.
A similar, perhaps more natural, possibility is that
the frame shift is a rotation about the z-axis by an an-
gle that is uniformly distributed between 0 and π. Us-
ing the same codewords, the protocol is still perfectly
sound and concealing, but Alice can now interpolate be-
tween committing to zero or one by sending the vector
cos(απ/2)xˆ + sin(απ/2)yˆ for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If she then
reveals zero, Bob will accept with probability 1 − α/2,
and if she reveals one, Bob will accept with probability
(1 + α)/2. For Alice, passive cheating is defined as com-
mitting honestly to a bit and then attempting to reveal
something different; here her success probability is still
1/2. However, if Alice chooses α = 1/2, then she can
convince Bob of either bit with probability 3/4.
These examples show that misaligned reference frames
can offer small advantages in security over noiseless quan-
tum communication. But can we do better? In the next
section, we show that in fact any number of bits can be
committed to any desired level of security for some dis-
tribution µ.
An Asymptotically Secure Scheme
For our scenario we first assume that Bob can mea-
sure the coordinates of a three-dimensional vector that
he receives with infinite precision. We then argue that
the security still holds in the case of finite precision.
The idea behind the scheme is two-fold. We show that
a single use of a channel can give rise to an (asymp-
totically) perfectly secure commitment when the chan-
nel acts on vectors in an arbitrarily high-dimensional
space. However, spatial reference frames are only three-
dimensional objects which seems to suggest that only a
partially secure bit commitment may be achievable. Our
scheme overcomes this apparent problem by parametriz-
ing three-dimensional vectors by coordinates of a d-
dimensional lattice.
Alice sends a vector ~v ∈ R3 to Bob. In Bob’s spatial
frame of reference this vector looks like R~v for some ran-
dom rotation R taken from the probability distribution
µ. The distribution µ of R is the following. Let there be
a set of angles θ ∈ {θ1, θ2, . . . , θd} which are not linearly
related, meaning that for all integers (positive or nega-
tive) n1, n2, . . . , nd,
∑d
i=1 niθi = 0 mod π if and only if
n1 = n2 = · · · = nd = 0. One of these angles θ is picked
uniformly at random. Then R is given by
R =



 cos θ sin θ 0− sin θ cos θ 0
0 0 1

 with prob. 1/2,

 cos 2θ sin 2θ 0− sin 2θ cos 2θ 0
0 0 1

 with prob. 1/2.
(1)
Let us describe our bit commitment protocol with this
distribution µ, known to Alice and Bob. Let L be a
positive integer.
• Commit. To commit to b ∈ {0, 1}, Alice chooses
a = (a1, . . . , ad) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L − 1}
d uniformly at
random, but conditioned on
∑d
i=1 ai = b mod 2.
Let α(a) =
∑d
i=1 aiθi. Alice sends the vector
~v = ~v(a) = (cosα(a), sinα(a), 0). Bob receives
this vector as R~v(a) = ~v(a′) with rotated angle
α′ =
∑
i a
′
iθi. He determines the d-dimensional lat-
tice vector a′. If he cannot find such a vector, he
aborts the protocol.
• Reveal. In the reveal phase, Alice simply sends
the classical bits (b, a) to Bob. Bob accepts when
b =
∑
i ai mod 2 and all coordinates of a − a
′ are
0 except one for which a′i−ai is either 1 or 2. Oth-
erwise he aborts.
Let us now show that this protocol has the desired
security properties.
Soundness. We assume that both parties are honest. To
understand a given realization of this protocol, let j be
such that the randomly chosen θ equals θj . In that case
the coordinates a′i of a
′ are
a′i =
{
ai + δij with prob. 1/2,
ai + 2δij with prob. 1/2.
(2)
Due to the linear independence of the θ-angles Bob can
perfectly compute a′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L+1}d from ~v(a′). Bob
will accept Alice’s message in the reveal phase since this
vector a′ is within distance 2 of the original a and the
noise acts on only one of the coordinates.
4Concealing. A bit commitment protocol is called ǫ-
concealing when for two different messages b = 0 and
b = 1 the distributions over random variables as viewed
by Bob are ǫ-close with respect to their variation dis-
tance. In our case Bob learns a′, thus we consider the
distance ǫ =
∑
a
′ |P (a′ | b = 0) − P (a′ | b = 1) |. For an
a′ with all coordinates at least 2 and at most L we have
P (a′ | b = 0) = P (a′ | b = 1). All other a′s are ‘bound-
ary’ cases, which we denote as a′ ∈ B, for which these
two conditional probabilities can be different. We upper
bound this boundary term as
∑
a
′∈B
|P (a′|b = 0)− P (a′|b = 1) | ≤
∑
a
′∈B
P (a′) <∼
1−
(
L− 1
L+ 2
)d
, (3)
which can be made arbitrarily small for large enough L
for any fixed d.
Binding. Consider Alice’s cheating strategies. She could
have sent a different vector, say ~w(β). In case ~w is not
in the x-y plane or if β 6=
∑
i biθi for some integers
bi ∈ {0, . . . , L + 1} Bob simply aborts. Alice could
try to cheat by revealing an a∗ and b∗ 6= b that pass
Bob’s test. Alice’s best option is to choose a∗ that is
the same as a except, say, the kth coordinate, which
is a∗k = ak + 1. This implies that that the parity b
∗ of
a∗ is opposite to b. With probability 1/d the noise acts
on the kth coordinate and so (a∗, b∗) passes Bob’s test.
The protocol is 1/d-binding.
In reality we should assume that Bob can only deter-
mine R~v with finite precision, which means that Bob
finds some vector ~w at Euclidean distance ≤ ε from
R~v. If ε is small enough, we can ensure that for all
x,y ∈ {0, . . . , L + 1}d, ||~v(x) − ~v(y)|| > 2ε, so Bob can
still determine a′ from ~w ≈ R~v, if Alice behaves honestly.
But what if Alice cheats and sends some arbitrary vec-
tor ~w to Bob? Notice, however, that this strategy could
only work if ||R~w − ~v(a′)|| ≤ ε, which happens if and
only if ||~w − ~v(a)|| ≤ ε. In particular, a is the only d-
dimensional vector such that ~v(a) is ε-close to ~w. Thus
if Alice later reveals a∗ 6= a, her cheating still succeeds
only with probability ≤ 1/d.
Remark: By increasing d and running the above proto-
col in parallel several times, it is also possible to commit
more than one bit.
It remains an open problem to get a more complete
overview of the (im)possibility of bit commitment for
general distributions µ. In particular it would be inter-
esting to find realistic noise models for, say, polarized
photons, that would allow for secure or approximately
secure bit commitment.
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